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1. INTRODUCTION
"[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurispru-
dence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish
-Judge Learned Hand, 19451
"Any review of Supreme Court decisions will reveal numerous
cases in which the Justices disagreed about the meaning of what
appeared on the surface to be simple legislative language." 2 Addition-
ally, in situations where there is disagreement on the meaning of statu-
tory language, the Supreme Court has held that "[t]here is a basic
difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted."' How-
* Articles and Comments Editor Elect, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate
2012, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2009, East Carolina University. I am grateful to
Professor Harvey Sepler, Tad Hethcoat, and Melanie Fernandez for their editing assistance.
Special thanks to my family for their unwavering support.
1. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
2. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
375, 378 (1992).
3. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004).
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ever, the Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v. United States' goes
against these ideals.
The Johnson case involved Florida's battery statute.' Under that
statute, battery can be committed through mere touching.6 The issue
before the Court was whether a prior conviction for battery by touching
constituted a violent felony and thus could be used for sentence
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA").
The Supreme Court's reversal of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Johnson resolved a long-standing circuit split over the statu-
tory meaning of "physical force."' Unfortunately, the reasoning for the
reversal was tenuous-based on a dictionary definition rather than the
well-defined common law meaning or the legislative history-in opposi-
tion to Congress's intent in enacting the ACCA.
While the ACCA has long been a heavily debated issue, most
points of contention involve the interpretation of the residual clause.9
The residual clause involves an analysis of what crimes present a "seri-
ous potential risk."'o This casenote does not join that discussion; rather,
it addresses a new and important question surrounding the ACCA-the
physical force clause.
Prior to the Johnson decision, there was a circuit split over whether
the requisite physical force to be considered a violent felony under the
ACCA included de minimis touching or whether the physical force must
be violent in nature." The Supreme Court, falling on the side of the split
that requires violent force, reversed the Eleventh Circuit.12 However,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, failed to follow well-established
canons of statutory interpretation, as well as his own advice in previous
decisions.
This casenote will discuss the errors in Justice Scalia's opinion and
4. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
5. FLA. STAT. § 784.03 (2009).
6. § 784.03.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
8. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1271.
9. For an in-depth review of the residual clause, see David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and
Known Associates: The Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209
(2010).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Nason,
269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that de minimis touching is
sufficient to qualify a crime as a violent felony); see also Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez-
Chavez, 432 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hayes, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that physical force must be violent in nature to qualify as a violent felony).
12. Johnson, 130 S. Ct 1265.
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why the Eleventh Circuit was correct in its interpretation of the ACCA.
Part II will discuss the history of the ACCA. Part III will discuss the
circuit split, as well as the Supreme Court's previous interpretations of
the ACCA. Part IV will discuss the facts of the Johnson case, the rea-
soning behind the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and why the Supreme
Court reversed. Part V will analyze the correct and incorrect aspects of
Justice Scalia's opinion and propose recommendations for how the con-
sequences of the Johnson decision should be resolved. Part VI
concludes.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
The ACCA allows for enhanced sentencing if a person is found in
possession of a weapon and has had three prior convictions for "violent
felonies." The statute has been a continuous problem among the cir-
cuits. 3 According to the ACCA, for any person who violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) and has three previous convictions for violent felonies or seri-
ous drug offenses, the minimum sentence is fifteen years and the maxi-
mum sentence is life." This is a large leap from the statutory maximum
of ten years for an unenhanced violation of § 922(g).
An enhanced sentence under the ACCA cannot be suspended or
probationary. However, pursuant to a 1994 amendment, the individual
may be considered for parole during this sentence.15 The only exception
to the mandatory minimum sentence applies where the defendant has
provided the government with substantial assistance, such as with a plea
agreement in exchange for testimony against another individual.' 6
The ACCA was originally introduced as the Career Criminal Life
Sentence Act of 1981 ("CCLSA"). It proposed a mandatory life sentence
for anyone who committed robbery or burglary three times." The bill
was amended and passed into law as the Armed Career Criminal Act of
1984." The version of the Act that was passed into law requires a per-
son to violate a federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms.
13. See, e.g., Smith, 171 F.3d 617; Nason, 269 F.3d 10; Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666; Belless, 338
F.3d 1063; Gonzalez-Chavez, 432 F.3d 334; Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339; Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d
1194; Hayes, 526 F.3d 674.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). This section makes it a crime for any felon to ship, transport,
possess, or receive firearms in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
15. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 110510(a) (1994) ("Section 924(e)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking
'and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed under this
subsection"').
16. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41449, ARMED CAREER CRiWuNAL Acr
(18 U.S.C. 9 2 4(E)): AN OVERVIEw 3 (2010).
17. S. 1688, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
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It also reduced the mandatory sentence to fifteen years.' 9
It is speculated that the supporters of the ACCA wanted the mini-
mum fifteen-year sentence imposed on anyone who committed robbery
or burglary three times, but, to address federalism concerns, Congress
had to tie the conviction to a federal law.20 In 1986, the ACCA was
broadened to its present wording to include convictions of violent felo-
nies and serious drug offenses.2 '
The term "violent felony" is defined by the ACCA as any crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that: (1) has an ele-
ment of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
another person; or (2) is burglary, arson, extortion, involves the use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another. 22
Moreover, the assessment of a particular crime involves examining
how the law defines the offense and not how the individual committed it
on a particular occasion.23 This standard, known as the categorical
approach, created confusion, and the courts did not have any guidance
for determining what amount of physical force was required to consider
a crime a violent felony. The Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v.
United StateS24 attempted to clarify the requisite threshold of physical
force.
III. THE "PHYSICAL FORCE" CIRCUIT SPLIT
It is unsurprising that much debate has surrounded the ACCA;
where federal sentencing statutes are triggered by state law, there is
bound to be some turmoil since the wording of the elements of a particu-
lar crime will vary state to state. In addition to the inconsistency
between states, many state statutes include variants of what constitutes a
19. Id.
20. James G. Levine, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 46
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 547 (2009).
21. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-849, at 6 (1986)).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
23. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990):
We think the only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is that, like the rest
of the enhancement statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the
fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. This categorical
approach, however, may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of
conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all
the elements of generic burglary. For example, in a State whose burglary statutes
include entry of an automobile as well as a building, if the indictment or information
and jury instructions show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a
building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict,
then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement.
24. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
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particular crime. This is especially true among state battery statutes,
which may or may not include offensive touching as an element.
The problem with such statutes is that if a court considers offensive
touching a "use or attempted use of physical force," then a conviction
for such touching can be used as a predicate offense for sentence
enhancement under the ACCA. On the contrary, if the court believes
touching does not involve physical force, then a conviction for such
touching does not count as one of the three permissible violent felonies.
The Supreme Court prescribed the formal categorical approach in
Taylor v. United States2 5 to determine whether a crime constitutes a vio-
lent felony under the ACCA. Using a formal categorical approach, a
sentencing court may only look at the statutory definition of the prior
offenses but not the facts underlying those convictions. 2 6 "This categori-
cal approach, however, may permit the sentencing court to go beyond
the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was
actually required to find all the elements of [the crime]."27 Cases falling
into that "narrow range" use a modified categorical approach, but the
application of this approach caused confusion among the circuits.28
Additionally, prior to Johnson v. United States,2 9 there was a circuit
split over whether the requisite physical force included de minimis
touching or whether the physical force must be violent in nature. The
First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits held that battery committed by de
minimis touching was sufficient to constitute a violent felony because it
required some level of physical force in the sense of "Newtonian
mechanics.""o In contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
rejected this test and held that the physical force required must be vio-
lent force.
The Eleventh Circuit expressly denounced the "violent physical
force" view of other circuits in United States v. Griffith32 as going
25. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
26. Id. at 601.
27. Id. at 602.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2010).
29. 130 S. Ct. at 1265.
30. United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Smith,
171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2007).
31. See, e.g., Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez-
Chavez, 432 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Hayes, 526 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2008).
32. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1345 (comparing Flores, 350 F.3d at 666):
If Congress had meant to say "violent physical force" it easily could have done so.
By reading into a statutory provision a restrictive word in order to guard against an
absurd result that it admits has little or no basis in the real world, the Flores court
2011] 1195
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against common sense. In that case, Judge Carnes defended the court's
position as following the intent of Congress. 3 In justification of the de
minimis test, the Griffith opinion cites 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which
restricts firearm possession for individuals subject to a court order that
prohibits "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force ...
that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury."34 Next, the
opinion concludes that, based on the language of the aforementioned
subsection, Congress knew how to limit "physical force" to something
more than de minimis force if it intended to do so. 35 Finally, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that where Congress does not include a limiting phrase,
a court cannot assume Congress intended physical force to mean violent
physical force.3 6
The Eleventh Circuit has remained consistent in defending the de
minimis test in similar cases involving the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.37 The United States Sentencing Guidelines were created to
provide federal judges with fair and consistent sentencing ranges to con-
sult." They explicitly aim to further Congress's intent in enacting the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984," which includes the
ACCA.4 0 Similar to the ACCA's definition of "violent felony," the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines define "crime of violence" as one that "has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another."4'
Courts have recognized that the definitions of "crime of violence"
and "violent felony" are virtually identical,4 2 and decisions addressing
one provide guidance for determination of the other. In United States v.
Glover13 and United States v. Llanos-Agostadero," the Eleventh Circuit
considered Florida's battery statute and whether it could be considered a
"crime of violence" under the definition set forth in the U.S. Sentencing
forced itself to what could be described as an absurd result in the case before it. In
doing so, it produced a decision that supplies, in the words of the concurring judge,
a good example for those who criticize our system of law (court decisions) as "not
tethered very closely to common sense."
33. Id. at 1342.
34. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1345.
37. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Harris, 305 F. App'x 552 (11th Cir. 2008).
38. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/About
theCommission/Overviewof theUSSC/USSCOverview_20101122.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2011).
39. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1976 (1984).
40. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A (2010).
41. Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Rainey, 362 F.3d 733, 734 (11 th Cir. 2004).
43. 431 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2005).
44. 486 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2007).
1196 [Vol. 65:1191
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Guidelines. In both cases, without much discussion, the court held that
battery under Florida's law is a crime of violence. 4 5
The Eleventh Circuit maintained its position on the de minimis test
of physical force, and the circuit split continued until March 2010 when
the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's determination of
what amount of physical force constituted a violent felony under the
ACCA.
IV. JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v. United States46 is
novel, as it is the first time the Court has addressed the physical force
clause of the ACCA.4 7 Additionally, the opinion resolved a long-stand-
ing circuit split and changed the interpretation courts use for enhancing
sentences of repeat offenders. Falling on the opposing side of the circuit
split, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit because the
majority believed the appropriate definition was that of a dictionary, as
opposed to congressional intent or common-law.
A. The Trial of Curtis Johnson
The case began when Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to knowingly
possessing ammunition, which violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) because he
was a previous felon. 48 The indictment specified five prior felony con-
victions, including aggravated battery and burglary of a dwelling in
October 1986, and battery in May 2003.49 Based on Johnson's criminal
history, the government sought an enhanced sentence under the
ACCA.o
At the sentencing hearing, Johnson conceded that the felonies com-
mitted in 1986 were violent felonies under the ACCA, but he objected to
the classification of his 2003 conviction as a violent felony. Johnson's
2003 Florida conviction was for violating Florida's battery statute which
occurs when a person "actually and intentionally touches or strikes
another person against the will of the other; or intentionally causes bod-
ily harm to another person."52
45. Glover, 431 F.3d 744; Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194.
46. 130 S. Ct. 1285 (2010).
47. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (No. 08-6925),
2009 WL 1510257 at *9.




52. FLA. STAT. § 784.03 (2009).
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Under Florida law, battery is a misdemeanor of the first degree.5 3
However, if a person has a prior conviction for battery and subsequently
commits another battery, that person has committed a felony of the third
degree. 54 Therefore, had it not been for Johnson's previous battery con-
viction, the second conviction in 2003 would have been a misdemeanor
and he would not have been subject to the enhanced sentence under the
ACCA.
The charging document in Johnson's felony battery case stated that
he "did actually and intentionally touch or strike the victim against the
will of said person . . . ."I However, the record from that conviction
does not state what the actual act was, and Johnson argued that the gov-
ernment could not prove that his actions included the requisite physical
force to be considered a violent felony.56 The trial judge rejected John-
son's argument, and Johnson was convicted and sentenced under the
ACCA in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida."
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit followed its prior decisions and
rejected Johnson's contention that the crime of battery under Florida law
is not necessarily a violent one under the ACCA.5 1 The court stated that
either the Florida law fits the ACCA's description of violent felony or it
doesn't, making it clear that the court was not willing to bend in its view
of the definition.59
In an attempt to divert the court from its decisions in Llanos-Agos-
tadero60 and Glover,6 1 Johnson directed the court's attention to a recent
case, State v. Hearns.6 2 In Hearns, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that battery on a law enforcement officer was not a "forcible felony" and
therefore not subject to sentencing under Florida's state statute for
enhanced sentences for career criminals.63
Johnson contended that the decision in Hearns was inconsistent
with Llanos-Agostadero and Glover, and the Eleventh Circuit had to fol-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Brief for the United States at 5, Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (No. 08-
6925), 2009 WL 3663947 at *7.
56. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 47, at 10.
57. United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1319 (11th Cir. 2008).
58. See id. at 1319-20.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2007).
61. United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2005).
62. 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007).
63. See id. (discussing FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (2009)).
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low the holding in Hearns because it must yield to interpretation of state
law by the highest court of that state.' Johnson's argument proved
unsuccessful and the Eleventh Circuit refused to follow Hearns in this
case for two reasons.
First, the court conceded that if state law is clarified in a way that is
inconsistent with one of its earlier decisions it could not be bound to
follow the earlier decision.6 5 However, the court stated that it was still
bound to follow its prior precedent because the decision in Llanos-Agos-
tadero came out nineteen days after Hearns.6 6 Additionally, the court
rejected the idea that the prior panel may have overlooked the Hearns
decision.6 7
The second reason the court declined to follow the holding in
Hearns was because the Llanos-Agostadero case, similar to the Johnson
case, involved the federal law definition of violence as applied to Flor-
ida's battery law,6 8 and therefore, could not have been overruled by
Hearns. The court stated that the Hearns decision would have been
binding if Johnson's case involved interpreting Florida's enhancement
statute as opposed to the federal ACCA.69 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected all other arguments made by Johnson:
His contention that the definition of felony for ACCA purposes does
not include a misdemeanor that became a felony only because of a
state recidivist statute is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. 1783 (2008). His
contention that the district court lacked the authority to sentence him
as an armed career criminal because he did not admit in his guilty
plea to the facts necessary to being one is foreclosed by Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). And his contention that
his sentence of 185 months for being an armed career criminal in
possession of ammunition violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment is foreclosed by United States v.
Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005) .. .70
In response to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, Johnson filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in October 2008. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on two issues." First, the Court agreed to review the issue




68. Id. at 1321.
69. See id. (referring to FLA. STAT. § 775.084).
70. Id. at 1322 (internal parallel citations omitted).
71. Questions Presented Report, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/08-06925qp.pdf (document
identifying which questions the Supreme Court agreed to review in Johnson v. United States).
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raised by the Hearns decision.7 2 Specifically, it agreed to address
whether, when a state's highest court holds that a given offense of that
state does not have as an element the use or threatened use of physical
force, that holding is binding on federal courts in determining whether
that same offense qualifies as a violent felony under the federal
ACCA." Second, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split
on whether a prior conviction for simple battery is in all cases a "violent
felony," and which physical force test the courts should apply in deter-
mining whether a crime is violent under the ACCA."
C. The Supreme Court's Reversal
Johnson's case was argued before the Supreme Court in October
2009 and was decided on March 2, 2010.75 Justice Scalia delivered the
opinion of the Court and Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.76 Justice Alito filed a
dissenting opinion and Justice Thomas joined."
The majority opinion began by addressing the first question
presented for review. The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and declined to follow Hearns because the meaning of physical
force under the ACCA is a question of federal law, not state law.7 8 The
Court concluded, however, that it is bound by the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of determining the elements of Florida's battery
statute.
Thus, the Supreme Court is bound by the Florida Supreme Court's
holding in Hearns that the elements of the battery statute are disjunctive;
Florida battery can be proven in one of three ways: the defendant inten-
tionally caused bodily harm, the defendant intentionally struck, or the
defendant merely actually and intentionally touched the victim.80 Fur-
thermore, if a defendant is being prosecuted under the element of touch-
ing the victim, this can be satisfied by any intentional contact, "no
matter how slight.""1
The Court concluded that since the record from Johnson's felony




75. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1269.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218 (Fla. 2007)).
81. Id. (citing Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 211).
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court was correct in concluding that the conviction rests on the least of
the acts under the statute-actually and intentionally touching.82
The more important issue in the case was whether the term "force"
in the ACCA refers to its general usage definition or to its technical
definition from common-law.8 ' At common-law, the element of "force"
could be satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching.84 However,
the Court stated that "[a]lthough a common-law term of art should be
given its established common-law meaning," this does not apply to a
statutory word if that common-law meaning does not fit."
The Court concluded that the common-law definition does not fit in
reference to the ACCA because at common-law all battery was a misde-
meanor.8 6 The Court continued by stating that "[it] is unlikely that Con-
gress would select as a term of art defining 'violent felony' a phrase that
the common-law gave peculiar meaning only in its definition of a misde-
meanor."" According to the Court, there is no reason to define violent
felony by reference to a nonviolent misdemeanor definition.88
Furthermore, referring to modem dictionaries, the Court considered
the definition of the word "force." The more general usage means
"strength or energy; active power; vigor; often an unusual degree of
strength or energy," "power to affect strongly in physical relations," or
"power, violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted on a person."89
Additionally, "physical force" is defined as "force consisting in a physi-
cal act, esp. a violent act directed against a robbery victim." 0 The Court
thought these definitions suggested a degree of power not satisfied by
battery through mere touching."
Thus, the main holding is that in the context of a statutory defini-
tion of "violent felony," the phrase "physical force" means violent
force-that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to
another person. 2 To prevent a continued circuit split, the Court made
sure to broaden its holding by stating that its interpretation of the physi-
cal force clause applied to the statutory category of violent felonies, not
just the crime of battery."
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1270.
84. Id. (citing Lynch v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 427, 248 (1921)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1271.
87. Id. at 1271-72.
88. Id. at 1272.
89. Id. at 1270 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 986 (2d ed. 1954)).
90. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 717 (9th ed. 2009)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1271.
93. See id.
2011] 1201
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The Court also rejected the government's contention that since sec-
tion 922 forbids the possession of firearms by a person subject to a court
order explicitly prohibiting the "use, attempted use or threatened use ...
that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury," and this lan-
guage is absent in section 924, it must mean that mere touching suf-
fices.94 Specifying that physical force must give rise to bodily injury in
one section does not prove the case is the same where physical force
lacks the qualification in a different section.95
The Government asked the Court to remand the case back to the
Eleventh Circuit for consideration of whether Johnson's felony battery
conviction was a violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA
but the Court refused.96 The basis of this decision was that the Govern-
ment disclaimed any reliance on the residual clause at sentencing.9 7
Additionally, both parties briefed the residual clause and the Eleventh
Circuit determined that Johnson's conviction could be considered a vio-
lent felony only if it satisfied the physical force clause." Thus, the Elev-
enth Circuit's strict defense of the de minimis test essentially precluded
remand for any other reason.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside Johnson's sentence and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion."
V. ANALYSIS: USING Too MUCH FORCE
In the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia clarified an important
element of ACCA cases-the use of the categorical approach. How-
ever, the rationale for the rest of the opinion was misguided for three
main reasons. First, the interpretation should have been guided by the
well-defined common law meaning, as opposed to the dictionary defini-
tion. Second, the legislative history compels an interpretation contrary to
that of the majority opinion. Finally, the opinion disregards standard
canons of statutory interpretation.
A. The Modified Categorical Approach:
An Appropriate Clarification
One important aspect of the Johnson decision is the clarification of
the modified categorical approach. As previously mentioned, many cir-
cuits were using the modified categorical approach inappropriately. For
94. Id. at 1272.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 1274.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008)).
99. Id. at 1274.
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example, a court could look at a trial record to determine if the crime
committed was a violent felony, or the court could look at the docu-
ments to determine if the individual acted violently when he committed
the crime. These two inquiries may seem very similar, but the second
inquiry goes beyond the sentencing court's allowable fact finding scope.
The Johnson decision clarifies that where a criminal statute can
only be violated in a violent way, a conviction for that crime qualifies as
a violent felony under the ACCA. The sentencing court can only make
factual inquiries when "the law under which the defendant has been con-
victed contains statutory phrases that cover several different generic
crimes, some of which require violent force and some of which do
not."'"0
When using the modified categorical approach, the sentencing
court may consult the trial record only to "determine which statutory
phrase was the basis for the conviction."10 ' Furthermore, it is clear from
Johnson that if a review of the permissible documents does not clarify
which portion of the statute served as the basis of the conviction then
that particular offense cannot qualify as a violent felony.
B. Physical Force Does Not Equal Violent Force
Although the Supreme Court may have appropriately clarified the
modified categorical approach, its decision that physical force means
violent force in the context of the ACCA was flawed. In addition to the
numerous errors that Justice Alito discusses in his dissent,"O2 a closer
look at the ACCA's legislative history provides further proof that the
majority made the wrong decision and the Eleventh Circuit's decision
was justified.
1. THE FORCE OF THE COMMON LAw DEFINITION
It is well established that the interpretation of well-defined words
and phrases in the common law carries over to statutes dealing with the
same or similar subject matter. 103 Additionally, common-law meanings
are assumed to apply even in statutes dealing with new and different
subject matter, to the extent they appear fitting and in the absence of
evidence to indicate contrary meaning." Furthermore, "When Congress
selects statutory language with a well-known common-law meaning, we
100. Id. at 1273.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1274-78 (Alito, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962).
104. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
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generally presume that Congress intended to adopt that meaning."o0 5
Both the majority and dissent recognize that the term "force" was
well-defined at common-law and that it included even the slightest
offensive touching.10 6 Therefore, following standard canons of statutory
interpretation, this should have been an easy decision-force must mean
even the slightest touching-but this is not how the majority decided.
The majority refused to follow the common-law definition because it
said the meaning did not fit. However, the opinion never explains why
the common-law meaning does not fit, and, since there is nothing in the
ACCA to suggest that Congress meant something other than the
accepted common-law meaning, it should have been used.'0
The majority also rejects the de minimis definition because at com-
mon-law battery was a misdemeanor, not a felony. This reasoning is
flawed. At common-law, felonies were originally violations of the feu-
dal obligation binding lord and vassal10 8 and, with the exception of petty
larceny, were punishable by death."09 Furthermore, it is likely that the
only common law felonies were murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary,
robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. t'0 The term felony was
generally connected with the idea of capital punishment and whenever a
statute made any new offense a felony, the law implied that the punish-
ment would be death by hanging, as well as forfeiture of property.'
Today, the division between felonies and misdemeanors is not as
clear. Even as early as the 1800's, scholars recognized that the common-
law distinction between felonies and misdemeanors was not the same as
the evolving American law." 2 "In several of the States all offences sub-
ject to death or imprisonment are made felonies; all others are misde-
meanors. In some states the distinction is abolished absolutely.""'
Today, the term felony is generally used to describe any crime that is
punishable by more than one year in prison,"' and as with the Johnson
105. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1274 (Alito, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 1270 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1274 (Alito, J., dissenting).
107. See, McComb, 331 U.S. 722.
108. AMERICAN TECHNICAL SOCIETY, LIBRARY OF AMERICAN LAW AND PRACTICE 196 (1919).
109. Id. at 197.
110. FRANCIS WHARTON & WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 29 (10th
ed. 1896).
111. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 484 (2d ed. 1858).
112. WHARTON & LEWIS, supra note 110, at 28:
Felonies, in England, as distinguished from misdemeanors, comprised originally
every species of crime which occasioned the forfeiture of lands and goods; but
though this distinction, originally based on the supposed heinousness of the crime,
is still nominally recognized, its continuance, which conducting to much technical
difficulty, is productive of not good, and its abolition is only a question of time.
113. Id. at 29.
114. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (9th ed. 2009).
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case, it is not uncommon for misdemeanors to be kicked up to felony
status based on the number of commissions, not the conduct involved.
If the majority is willing to include Johnson's battery conviction,
which would have originally been a misdemeanor under Florida law, as
a violent felony, then its logic is self-defeating. Therefore, the Johnson
majority's rationale that common-law misdemeanors and felonies must
be treated the same as current day crimes was unfounded.
2. JUSTICE SCALIA'S INAPPROPRIATE USE OF THE DICTIONARY
Rather than relying on the well-defined common-law meaning of
physical force, Justice Scalia relies almost entirely on Webster's New
International Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary. This is not the
first time Justice Scalia has relied on such tools, and scholars have criti-
cized him for his inconsistent use of dictionary definitions." 5 A com-
mon theme in these critiques is that "Justice Scalia's use of dictionaries
as a tool of textualism appears instrumental indeed, invoked only when
it produces the desired result."" 6 He relies on dictionary definitions
where they can be read to narrow governmental power but rejects them
in other cases where reliance on them would result in a broadening of
governmental power."'
Justice Scalia has long emphasized the importance of interpreting
statutes based on their "ordinary meaning," but which of the many
meanings of a word is the ordinary meaning is unclear. He announced
his theory of ordinary meaning and its connection to dictionary defini-
tions in his dissent in Chisom v. Roemer.' 18 In that case, like in his opin-
ion in Johnson, Justice Scalia cited the second edition of Webster's New
International Dictionary as his main support and treated it as conclu-
sive.1"9 Also similar to his opinion in Johnson, Justice Scalia's dissent in
Chisom relies on the second edition of Webster's Dictionary, 120 rather
than the more up-to-date third edition which was published in 1961.121
He also ignores other definitions that do not support the side that he is
advocating.
Conversely, Justice Scalia rejected the use of Webster's and
Black's in Bowen v. Massachusetts.12 2 In Bowen, the Supreme Court
115. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIz. ST. L.J. 275 (1998).
116. Id. at 321.
117. Id. at 319.
118. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
119. Aprill, supra note 115, at 316.
120. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY (3d ed. 1961).
122. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
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was faced with the task of interpreting the statutory meaning of "money
damages" and "adequate remedy."123 Justice Scalia castigated the major-
ity's interpretation because the terms "damages," "specific relief," and
"adequate remedy" have been "used in the common law for centuries,
and have meanings well established by tradition."1 24 He goes on to criti-
cize the majority for using the common-law meaning for interpretation
of one term but not for the other.12 5
Subsequently, in his dissent in Moskal v. United States,126 Justice
Scalia used dictionaries but not in the same manner he used them in
Johnson; he used them to support the argument that the specialized legal
meaning was the correct statutory interpretation. He argued that the
"layman's understanding" should not be the governing criterion for
determining the meaning of a term. 127 Quoting Justice Jackson, Justice
Scalia further argued that when a statute uses a term that has a special-
ized meaning relevant to the statutory construction before the Court, it is
that meaning that prevails:
Where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be taken
as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as departure from
them. 128
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia cites to Black's in Johnson.1 29 Yet, this
does not aid his argument. Black's "defines 'force' as 'power, violence,
123. Id.
124. Id. at 918 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 927 (citations omitted):
This novel approach completely ignores the well-established meaning of "adequate
remedy," which refers to the adequacy of a remedy for a particular plaintiff in a
particular case rather than the adequacy of a remedy for the average plaintiff in the
average case of the sort at issue. Although the Court emphasizes that the phrase
"money damages" should be interpreted according to the "ordinary understanding of
the term as used in the common law for centuries," it appears to forget that
prescription when it turns to the equally ancient phrase "adequate remedy."
Evidently, whether to invoke "ordinary understanding" rather than novel meaning
depends on the task at hand.
126. 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
127. Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Even on the basis of a layman's understanding,
therefore, I think today's opinion in error. But in declaring that understanding to be the governing
criterion, rather than the specialized legal meaning that the term 'falsely made' has long
possessed, the Court makes a mistake of greater consequence.").
128. Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
129. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1270 (2010) (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
717 (9th ed. 2009)).
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or pressure directed against a person or thing.' And it defines 'physical
force' as 'force consisting in a physical act, esp. a violent act directed
against a robbery victim."'10 While Black's says that force can mean a
violent act, there are many other ways the word can be used.
Furthermore, Black's definition for physical force supports the
Eleventh Circuit's decision because, while the definition does say that
an example of physical force is a violent act directed against a robbery
victim, it does not define all physical force as violent. In fact, its general
definition is merely "force consisting in a physical act," which clearly
encompasses battery by touching.
Exclusive of the ability to select from among various dictionary
definitions, a major flaw in the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries in
opinions is the lack of a relationship to statutory meaning. Using a dic-
tionary definition to interpret statutes results in a decision that is igno-
rant of the context in which the words are used.
In Smith v. United States,13 ' Justice Scalia criticized the majority
for relying on the dictionary to interpret the word "use." He stated that
it is a "fundamental principal of statutory construction (and, indeed, of
language itself) that the [dictionary defined] meaning of a word cannot
be determined in isolation" because there are many ways in which a
word can be used.132 Thus, while using a dictionary may aid in statutory
interpretation, it should not be the final step; the best way to know the
true meaning of the statute is to look at the legislative history.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
"Whenever there is some uncertainty about the meaning of a stat-
ute, it is prudent to examine its legislative history.""' A sample study
found that Justice Scalia interprets statutes in light of statutory purpose
in approximately 72% of cases, but he only cites to legislative history
less than 9% of the time and this is sometimes only to refute the major-
ity's interpretation of the history.1 34 Unfortunately, the Court did not
consider legislative history in Johnson, even though the Court has
reviewed legislative history in cases interpreting the residual clause of
the ACCA. 3 5 If the legislative history had been considered, the decision
130. Id.
131. 508 U.S 223, 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 241-42.
133. Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
134. Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice
Scalia's Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 Miss. L.J. 129, 170-71 (2008).
135. See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575 (1990).
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might have turned out differently.
The legislative history of the ACCA supports Justice Alito's dis-
senting argument that "it is apparent that the ACCA uses 'violent fel-
ony' as a term of art with a broader meaning than the phrase may convey
in ordinary usage."l 3 6 When Senator Specter introduced the CCLSA (the
predecessor to the ACCA) to the Senate, he referred to robberies and
burglaries as the "most vicious forms of street crime in this country."' 37
However, neither crime necessarily fits the Johnson majority's defini-
tion of violent crime because, while violence may be involved, neither
robbery nor burglary requires violent force as an element. In fact, the
congressional record discusses that physical injury during robberies
occurs only about 30 percent of the time."'
Moreover, when Senator Specter introduced the 1986 amendment,
it was originally intended to include a conviction for a "crime of vio-
lence or a serious drug offense." 39 A crime of violence was defined as
"an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another"4 0 or
"any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense."' 4 '
Although the wording of the amendment was changed, the transi-
tion from only punishing crimes of robbery and burglary to the introduc-
tion of an amendment that includes damage to property shows Congress
intended for "physical force" to encompass crimes that do not necessa-
rily pose a risk of potential injury.
More convincingly, the legislative history suggests that Congress's
aim was to include as many criminals as possible under the ACCA for
three reasons. First, Congress wanted to address the backlog in the
courts due to repeat offenders.142 Second, the threat of a harsh sentence
to a wide range of criminals would act as a deterrent.'43 Finally, apply-
ing the ACCA to all habitual offenders could be used as leverage for
testimony or assistance to the United States attorneys to convict the
worst of the habitual offenders.'"
The original introduction of the ACCA to Congress included a dis-
136. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1275 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. 127 CONG. REc. 22,669 (1981).
138. Id. at 22,670.
139. 132 CONG. REc. 7698 (1986).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. 127 CONG. REc. 22,670 (1981).
143. 132 CONG. REc. 7697 (1986).
144. Id.
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cussion about the burden that repeat offenders are on the criminal justice
system.145 As a result of the backlog, the jails holding defendants await-
ing trial become severely overburdened, "resulting in more crimes by
defendants on bail and decreasing the deterrent effect on others."' 4 6 This
results in "excessive plea bargaining and unduly short sentences,"14 7
leaving the criminals to commit more crimes and further burden the jus-
tice system.
Moreover, in enacting the CCLSA, Congress found that "many
repeat offenders cannot reasonably be rehabilitated and, unless incarcer-
ated for life, will commit further felonies."'18 Essentially, Congress was
concerned with getting habitual offenders off of the streets permanently.
Senator Specter introduced the 1986 amendment because "the time
[had] come to broaden that [career criminal] definition so that we may
have a greater sweep and more effective use of this important statute." 4 9
Additionally, he stated that the original act had worked exactly as
planned and should be expanded.15 0
Local prosecutors use the law in two ways. First, district attorneys
refer these toughest criminals to the U.S. attorney for prosecution in
Federal courts, which can provide more swift and certain trial and
sentencing. Second, district attorneys use the mere prospect of such
referral and the extremely stiff penalties to get a favorable guilty plea
at a local level. I believe that this "leveraging" effect is one of the
most important aspects of the statute. 151
Congress believed that this leveraging effect could be used more
effectively if it was expanded to include more crimes. Therefore, since
getting criminals off of the streets and assisting the U.S. attorneys in
doing so are the two main ideas behind the ACCA, it makes sense that a
broad reading of the statute, to include as many criminals as possible, is
appropriate.
145. 127 CONG. REc. 22,670 (1981):
[I]n some large urban jurisdictions, the criminal justice systems are so severely
overloaded as to be incapable of combating this epidemic of armed robberies and
burglaries by career criminals ... . Where the justice system is overwhelmed by the
volume of crime and cases, the results are disastrous. For example, in New York
City, there were 539,000 felony complaints in 1979. Arrests were made in only
105,000 cases, I in 5. Of those arrested only 16,000 - less than 1 in 5 - were
indicted and 12,000 were convicted. Thus, only 1 in 10 arrests resulted in a finding
of guilt. Of 12,000 convicted, only 4,000 were sentenced to imprisonment. That is
only about 4 percent of those arrested.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 22,671.
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4. MORE CANONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
It is well established that if "Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."l5 2 The residual clause, which
follows the physical force clause, includes any crimes that present a
"serious potential risk of physical injury to another."' In dissent, Jus-
tice Alito correctly recognized that because Congress did not include the
same limiting phrase in the physical force clause, the Court should pre-
sume that Congress did not intend for any limitation to apply to the term
"physical force."154
Moreover, courts should not construe different terms within the
same statute to embody the same meaning,"' and a court must, if possi-
ble, give effect to every clause and word of a statute.15 6 The majority
held that in the context of the ACCA, physical force means violent
force-"force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another per-
son."' Based on the majority's interpretation of the meaning of "physi-
cal force," the clause would be unnecessary because the physical force
clause would have the same meaning as the residual clause-conduct
that poses a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congres-
sional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it
is the duty of the court, absent a clearly expressed congressional inten-
tion to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Therefore, since the
majority's interpretation assumes the intent from a non-existent limiting
phrase which renders the physical force clause ineffective, the Court's
decision was erroneous.
C. Critics and the Rule of Lenity Issue
Critics of a broad reading of the ACCA will argue that the rule of
lenity prevents such a reading. However, the Supreme Court has stated
that its "unwillingness to soften the import of Congress' chosen words
even if [it] believe[s] the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding.
It results from 'deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well as
recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a
152. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
154. See Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1275 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
155. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.
156. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).
157. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1267.




Moreover, the rule of lenity cannot be invoked in this case because
"that venerable rule is reserved for cases where, after seizing every thing
from which aid can be derived, the Court is left with an ambiguous stat-
ute."160 "The mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction,
however, does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable."16 Since
the Court did not review everything available to it in an effort to deter-
mine the statutory meaning, and since reviewing the legislative history
would have made the statute's meaning clear, critics cannot argue that
the rule of lenity is required to resolve an ambiguity.
D. The Future of the ACCA-Senator Specter's Final Attempt
During finalization of this case note, and in response to the Court's
decision, Senator Specter proposed an amendment to the ACCA on
December 17, 2010 because,
[diespite the best efforts of Federal prosecutors to enforce section
924(e) for the safety of the community, there have been numerous
instances in which armed career criminals have not been sentenced
consistent with congressional intent due to the precedent that has sig-
nificantly narrowed the applicability of section 924(e) and prevented
judges from exercising their historic discretion and judgment. 16 2
The text of section 924(e)(2) was to be amended to completely
remove the term "violent felony" from the ACCA.16 s Additionally, the
physical force clause was to be amended to include "the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force, however slight, against the per-
son of another individual." 1" The amendment also proposed a separa-
tion of the "burglary, arson, or extortion" clause and the "serious
potential risk of injury" clause. 165
Based on these proposals, it is clear that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Johnson went against Congress's intent. The proposed qualifying
phrase "however slight" to the physical force clause includes battery by
touching. Following the discussion above, these proposed amendments
should not come as a shock; however there are a few concerns with the
wording of the proposed amendment.
First, the bill included a proposal to eliminate the categorical
approach:
159. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
160. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Armed Career Criminal Sentencing Act of 2010, S. 4045, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
163. Id. at § 3.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id.
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In determining whether a person shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for the mandatory minimum term of years under [the Act], the court
- (I) is not limited to the elements of the statute of conviction and
shall consider the facts of the previous conviction as presented in the
judicial records of the previous conviction, the presentence report, or
any other reliable evidence presented to the court; and (II) shall deter-
mine whether the person has such previous convictions by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.166
The problem with completely eliminating the categorical approach
is that is raises Sixth Amendment concerns. While the modified categor-
ical approach restricts courts to review facts only in an effort to deter-
mine an issue of law, unfettered discretion of the courts to review facts
of previous convictions and make a determination "by a preponderance
of the evidence" may violate a defendant's right to trial by jury. This
was the concern of the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey.167
In Apprendi, the Court struck down a state mandatory sentence
enhancement scheme and stated that, "when a judge's finding based on a
mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maxi-
mum punishment, it is appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense.' "168 Therefore, if Senator Specter's
2010 bill had passed, it is likely that the court system would be flooded
with cases involving Sixth Amendment issues.
In addition to the Sixth Amendment concerns, it is impractical to
require a court to review the trial documents for every offense, espe-
cially when the wording of the statute of conviction is clear. This would
violate principles of judicial economy and would often be futile since
the records often fail to provide a complete picture. A more practical and
sound approach for Congress would be to remain silent on this particular
issue. The Supreme Court has already laid out the modified categorical
approach for when the elements of a state statute are disjunctive and this
is how it should remain.
The Armed Career Criminal Sentencing Act of 2010 was intro-
duced late in the 111th Congress and died in committee.16 9 Senator
Specter, the driving force behind this bill, and the many before it,
recently lost his seat after 30 years in Congress.o7 0 Therefore, it is
unclear whether this bill will be reintroduced in the 112th Congress. The
166. Id. at § 4.
167. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
168. Id. at 495.
169. Armed Career Criminal Sentencing Act of 2010, S. 4045, 11 1th Cong. § 2 (2010), http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 111 :s4045:.
170. Huma Khan et al., Longtime Senator Arlen Specter Loses Bid for Sixth Term to




amendments to subparagraph (B) of the ACCA, proposed by Senator
Specter, are necessary to fix the damage caused by the Johnson decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not uncommon for Congress to draft a statute that is open to
interpretation. In such situations, many readers of the statute will likely
come to different conclusions about what the statute actually means.
This is why sometimes, in an absence of clear congressional intent, it is
necessary for the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of the statute
to create precedent for the lower courts.
However, the justices are not immune from reading different mean-
ings into an ambiguous statute. Therefore, standard canons of statutory
interpretation are imperative to the creation of consistent precedent.
When these canons of interpretation do not sufficiently clarify the mean-
ing, it is important to look at the legislative history to determine con-
gressional intent.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Johnson was not only inconsistent with
standard canons of statutory interpretation; he also failed to use tools to
determine congressional intent. If he had considered all of the materials
available, rather than merely considering the dictionary, Johnson's 2003
conviction would have been considered a violent felony.
It is clear from the legislative history that the Eleventh Circuit was
correct in its interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act and use of
the de minimis test. However, since the Supreme Court reversed, Con-
gress needs to amend the ACCA to make the intent more clear and to
counteract the narrowing effects the Court has created.
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